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NOTES
INTERNET COMMUNICATION
STANDARDS FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY:
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MUST
FORCE THE U.S. TO ADOPT
"CARNIVORE" AND NEW
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
STANDARDS
I. FOREWORD
Sitting down to write this Note in late fall 2000, the
state of international terrorism was much different than
that which it would become in less than a year. At the
time, organized attacks on American interests were on
the rise, most recently the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in
Yemen. While the destructiveness of terrorist attacks had
been slowly rising over the previous decade, by the time of
the Cole attack it became clear to many that the organiza-
tions recruiting, planning and carrying out these deadly
attacks were becoming more advanced, primarily through
the use of the Internet and electronic communications.
In early September 2001, preparing to go to print,
the world was much the same as it had been nine months
earlier. Concern was growing, and government agencies
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had stepped up their abilities to conduct electronic sur-
veillance of the Internet. These advances were also coun-
tered by a growing concern for a protection of privacy
rights, and in my view, the need for a new Internet sur-
veillance law to properly balance the competing interests
of security and fundamental rights in the new century.
September 11th changes everything, for all of us.
An attack on the U.S., as I will discuss, was seen as im-
minent. What was never comprehended, was the destruc-
tion of the World Trade Center and attack on the Penta-
gon via hijacked airliners. The death toll in New York and
Washington was astounding. In the aftermath, the re-
building process has been a challenge for the entire coun-
try. Despite this dramatic change of events and ensuing
war in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban and bring
Osama bin Laden to justice, the need still exists for a 21st
century approach to electronic surveillance and a new law
to set standards for dealing with the internet and its ca-
pabilities. In a Postscript, I will briefly examine the pro-
posed changes to surveillance law following September
11th, noting that the United Kingdom's Regulation of In-
vestigatory Powers Act is still a new approach to surveil-
lance containing provisions the U.S. may find useful in
the new campaign to rid the world of terrorism.
II. INTRODUCTION
October 12 was another clear, sun soaked afternoon
in the deep-water port of Aden, Yemen. The U.S.S. Cole, a
505-foot-long Aegis guided-missile destroyer, one of the
Navy's newest and most lethal, was slowly being tied up
to anchor buoys in preparation for refueling.! Standing
under the Arabian Peninsula's broiling noon-sun, her
lookouts patrolled the decks, with an eye, and sidearm, on
the watch for any signs of danger. Scampering around
the Cole were a half-dozen or so smaller vessels, hauling
her huge mooring lines onto the buoys.'
1. Richard J. Newman, A Hole in the Water Line, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT, Oct. 23, 2000, at 26, 26.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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One of those ships, with two men aboard, suddenly
dropped the lines and accelerating to full speed, headed
directly at the Cole's port side midsection. Seconds later,
an enormous explosion rocked the destroyer, tearing a
forty foot hole through the ship's thick re-enforced steel.5
The force of the blast, the result of enough C-4 plastic ex-
plosive6 to level a building, tore into the Cole's engine
room and mess hall. Crowded with sailors lined up for
chow, the shear force of the blast pushed the mess hall
upward, into the deck above.' When the smoke cleared,
seventeen crewmen were dead, and thirty-nine more suf-
fered injuries! This was the latest in a growing number of
terrorist attacks on American citizens and armed forces
around the world.
Terrorist attacks, like the one on the Cole, seem to
be a common, nearly routine occurrence over the past
decade. In August 1998, American embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania were bombed, killing 224.9 These acts of
violence have been attributed to the work of Osama bin
Laden, the Saudi millionaire currently directing his fol-
lowers from within the mountains of Afghanistan." While
terrorism has been a tactic of fear for hundreds of years, it
is rapidly metamorphasizing amid the technological ad-
vancements of the Information Age. Through the Internet
explosion and communication revolution, global terrorism
stands ready to enter the new millennium. With the bene-
fit of the Internet, electronic mail, chat rooms, instant
electronic messaging, electronic banking, cell phones and
satellite uplinks, terrorists are changing the way they
spread fear and their ideological message via modern
telecommunications.
To combat these new forms, the United States has
taken the lead in electronic communication surveillance.
With the creation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Alleged 'Cole' Accomplices Detained, TIMES UNION, Nov. 20,
2000, at A3.
7. Newman, supra note 1, at 26.
8. Yemen's President Naming Names, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2000,
at B1.
9. David A. Vise & Lorraine Adams, Bin Laden Weakened, Offi-
cials Say, WASH. POST, March 11, 2000, at A3.
10. Id.
2001] 247
BROOK. J. INTL L.
("FBI's") Carnivore Diagnostic Tool, U.S. law enforcement
now possess the capability of effectively intercepting
Internet communications of terrorist organizations.1' This
tool, however, is still in the testing phase. What is cur-
rently needed is a new, comprehensive surveillance law
that clearly protects privacy while addressing the new
international terrorist threats made possible through re-
cent technological advancements. With higher stakes in
the electronic 21st century, terrorists like bin Laden have
the capacity to be more effective, with much deadlier ca-
pabilities. One recent model the U.S. must follow in its
synthesis of surveillance needs and privacy concerns is
the United Kingdom's Regulation of Investigatory Powers
Act ("RIPA") 13 , a new law that takes current global devel-
opments and human rights concerns into effect while
dealing with the new concerns of the Internet. This Note
will argue that the fusion of internet capabilities and
weapons of mass destruction in the hands of those sworn
to spread terror, creates a combination that demands both
the Carnivore system and a new type of U.S. electronic
privacy for the 21st century's Information Age; one based
on RIPA that allows updated electronic surveillance of the
Internet, buffered by privacy laws that take digital
threats into account.
Part III of this Note will examine acts of terrorism
over the past decade, and address the advanced capabili-
11. Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's "Carnivore" Pro-
gram: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 11 (2000) (statement by Donald M. Kerr, Assis-
tant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation) [herein-
after Kerr-House].
12. See Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism and Government
Information of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 29 (2000)
(statement by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, Chairman, National Commit-
tee on Terrorism) [hereinafter Bremer]; World Wide Threats to National Se-
curity: Hearing on Threats to U.S. National Security Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement by Louis J. Freeh, Di-
rector, Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at 1998 WL 8991513
[hereinafter Freeh].
13. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 29 (Eng.) [here-
inafter RIPA]. The full text of RIPA is available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000023.htm (last visited
Oct. 1, 2001).
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ties of terrorists via modern communication technology.
With an eye toward threats of the future, I will argue that
Internet surveillance capabilities are indeed necessary, as
law enforcement must keep up with the great advances of
the Internet in terrorism prevention.
Part IV will address the current mix of communica-
tion, privacy, and crime laws in the U.S. Special attention
will be paid to the newly operational Carnivore system,
and the extent to which these older laws attempt to regu-
late its use.
Part V will analyze the current state of privacy in
the U.K. and the European conventions that affect it. I
will then closely analyze the provisions of the new surveil-
lance act, and draw comparisons to what is needed in the
U.S. to govern Carnivore.
Part VI will argue that the U.S. must adopt a simi-
lar comprehensive law based on RIPA, especially when
current fears concerning Carnivore are taken into effect.
We will conclude in Part VII that, facing the realities of
future terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruc-
tion, coupled with the enhanced tactical capabilities of the
Internet, a Carnivore system is required in U.S., but one
that will be governed by a new Internet privacy and sur-
veillance law that follows recent international trends.
III. THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Traditionally, terrorism has been employed for cen-
turies as a means of forcing change through heightened
diplomatic pressure and politically consequential violence
without having to bear responsibility. 4 By creating fear, it
undermines the confidence of society, and radicalizes us,
through resentment, to revere any counter-action. 5 At its
14. See W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Ter-
rorism, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 3, 10, 60 (1999).
15. See William Rees-Mogg, A Devil for Our Time, THE TIMES OF
LONDON, Aug. 24, 1998, at 18. See also JAMES DAVIDSON & LORD WILLIAM
REES-MOGG, THE SOVEREIGN INDIVIDUAL: HOW TO SURVIVE AND THRIVE DURING
THE COLLAPSE OF THE WELFARE STATE (1997); 141 CONG. REc. S2502-03 (daily
ed. Feb. 10, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden) (In reference to the World Trade
Center bombing, Sen. Biden stated, "the revelation that terror networks are
operating in our midst undeniably has its intended effect on our national
psyche - it undermines the sense of security of all Americans both at home
and abroad."); Norman Dorsen, The Need For a New Enlightenment: Lessons
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core, terrorism has three effects: An immediate effect of
killing or injuring those who are deemed a prohibited tar-
get; an intermediate effect of intimidating the larger
population therefore influencing their political behavior;
and an aggregate effect of undermining overall public or-
der. 6 Because international terrorism is usually a con-
sciously adopted rather than spontaneous or impulsive
strategy, the most important goals of effective response
must center on arresting, deterrence and prevention. 7 For
some time, the United States Congress has defined terror-
ism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence per-
petrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents;" international terrorism is
defined as "terrorism involving citizens or the territory of
more than one country."'8 In the last five to eight years
however, terrorism has taken on new capabilities and new
targets. In 1993, the World Trade Center was bombed,
and further planned attacks on New York City tunnels
were thwarted in their advanced stages. 9 In 1995, a plot
to blow up eleven U.S. airlines was also exposed.20 Over-
seas, more than 6,000 casualties were caused by a mere
three attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tan-
zania and an Air Force barracks in Saudi Arabia. 21 These
were all done with the use of conventional weapons. Re-
cent threats, and the stakes, have begun a dramatic evo-
lution.22
Historically, in its infancy, terrorism was employed
in the late 18th century revolutionary France as a means
in Liberty from the Eighteenth Century, in THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAW, AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 1789-1987 22, 36 (James Brewer Stuart ed., 1987)
(Dorset explained the psychological damage of terrorism as clutching us in its
grip, leaving us with a loss of control. "Order unravels. Institutions lose their
self-confidence. Reason itself - the belief that human problems have rational
solutions - is under attack.").
16. Reisman, supra note 14, at 7.
17. Id.
18. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(1)-(2) (1994).
19. See Bremmer, supra note 12, at 32.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 30-3 1.
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of low-level revolt fought close to home.2' At its most basic
form, the modern Western idea of terrorism is directly
credited to Maximilien Robespierre and his Reign of Ter-
ror from 1793 to 1794, where he created an organization
that attempted to systematize murder and lawlessness
into a set of rules.' Adopted in Ireland to oppose English
rule and occupation, its crude tactics of small-scale bomb-
ings and attacks have been used by Baske separatists in
Spain, revolutionaries in Sri Lanka and throughout the
Middle East, just to name a few political hot spots. 2 Re-
cently, however, with the dawning of the new Information
Age, capabilities of effecting terrorist attacks throughout
the globe have been expanded, mainly due to modern com-
munication advancements and the Internet. The United
States, now more than ever, is vulnerable to this new
breed of international terrorism, as modern technology
has given terrorists abilities unheard of only a few years
ago.
A. Dawning of the Information Age and the New Terrorist
The Internet ("Net" or 'Web") was originally devel-
oped by the Department of Defense in the early 1960's as
a means of information exchange for scientists and aca-
demics.27 Until the mid 1990's, the National Science
Foundation maintained the communications medium.3
Out of its innocent beginnings, the Net has exploded
within the last ten years into a primary source of global
communication. Currently, 500 million personal com-
puters are connected to the Web worldwide.29 In the U.S.
alone, a December 1999 Harris poll found 56% of adults
are now on-line, six times higher than in 1995.30 The
23. ALBERT PARRY, TERRORISM: FROM ROBESPIERRE TO ARAFAT 39
(1976).
24. Id.
25. SuzANNE ROBITAILLE ONTIVEROS, GLOBAL TERRORISM (Pamela R.
Byrne & Suzanne R. Ontiveros eds., 1986). See also WALTER LAQUEUR, THE
TERRORISM READER: A HISTORICAL ANTHOLOGY (1978).
26. See Freeh, supra note 12.
27. Alan E. Wiseman, Economic Perspectives on the Internet, at
http'/www.ftc.gov/be/execsumm.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Fourth Amendment and the Internet: Hearings Before the Sub-
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Internet has blossomed into a major source of commerce,
or "E-commerce" with billions of dollars in sales transac-
tions occurring every year." It has allowed for instantane-
ous communication via electronic mail, chat rooms where
anyone can log onto a Web page and join an open discus-
sion and hundreds of thousands of Web sites overflowing
with all types of information imaginable. Nationwide,
telephone lines are being upgraded to integrate telephone,
television and Internet capabilities to allow for faster
downloading speeds. Yet, along with this new electronic
lifestyle of immediate communication, high efficiency and
instant gratification, there is great vulnerability. Over the
last five years in particular, we have witnessed a continu-
ing steady growth of criminal and terrorist elements em-
ploying these new capabilities.
32
Recent reliance on and advancements in computers
and communication technology have freed organizations
and individuals from the constraints of specific locations.3
The result is the inadvertent creation of a new breed of
international terrorist with far greater capabilities of
wreaking havoc than ever before, and exploiting vulner-
abilities from anywhere in the world.34 With the Internet
explosion, the most notable benefactor of the communica-
tion revolution has been Osama bin Laden. The Saudi
born millionaire, whose anti-American terrorist network
al Queda has a presence in twenty-four countries, includ-
ing the U.S., and is believed to control forces of over 3,000
men, is dedicated to forcing American influence out of the
Middle East.35 Bin Laden had ties to Ramzi Yousef, con-
victed mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing in
February 1993, and was accused of being the brains be-
hind the August 1998 bombings of American embassies in
comm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
22 (2000) (testimony of James X. Dempsey, Senior Staff Counsel, Center for
Democracy and Technology) [hereinafter Dempsey].
31. Wiseman, supra note 27.
32. See Kerr-House, supra note 11, at 14.
33. See Rees-Mogg, supra note 15, at 18.
34. Freeh, supra note 12.
35. Kevin Whitelaw, The Ball Goes Up, But What Comes Down? As-
sessing Terrorists' Plans for the Millennium, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
Dec. 27, 1999, at 20, 20.
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Africa." Living in hiding deep within the mountains of
Afghanistan, the Net has allowed bin Laden to serve as
planner, communication center and bank roller for at-
tacks such as these. 7
B. Terrorism Advances via Modern Communication
In its current form, the Internet can be harnessed
by terrorists and hate groups primarily in four ways:
Planning attacks, recruiting followers, financing their
campaigns and carrying out acts of "cyber-terrorism."8 All
three give them a great edge in achieving their goals of
spreading fear through violence. One documented case of
trans-Atlantic planning surfaced in October 1996, when
Israeli Defense Forces asserted that activists of the fun-
damental Islamic terrorist group Hamas, living in the
United States, were planning attacks via Internet chat
rooms and e-mail in coordinating -activities across Gaza,
Lebanon and the West Bank. In his statement on the
worldwide threat in the year 2000, Director of Central In-
telligence George Tenet testified that such groups, includ-
ing Hezbollah, Abu Nidal and al Queda, were found to
have widely adapted information technology, relying on
the Web, e-mail and electronic bulletin boards to allow
members to exchange information without running a high
risk of being captured by U.S. counter-terrorism forces. 0
On the cutting edge, they even employ laptops, palmtops,
cell phones and satellite phones to communicate.4' With
only satellites and the Internet, bin Laden has continued
36. Tim Weiner, Dossier of Terror: Osama bin Laden, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al.
37. See Rees-Mogg, supra note 15, at 18.
38. See Anthony Forster, Hi-Tech Terrorists Turn to Cyber Warfare,
JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REv., Sep. 1999, at 46, 46-48.
39. Id. at 46.
40. Carnivore Diagnostic Tool: Testimony Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant
Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at
http'j/www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/congressO/kerrO9O600.htm (last visited
Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Kerr-Senate].
41. See Kavita Kaur, Terrorists on the Net: Dynamiting the Peace
Domain, CoMPUTERS TODAY, Aug. 15, 1999, at 78.
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to plan and direct successful terrorist attacks without be-
ing hindered by counteractions from the West.42
Terrorist organizations have also been successful in
employing the Net for recruiting purposes, creating new
independent cells around the world as old ones are used
up or captured.43 Recent studies have shown this to be
both cheap and incredibly effective. 4' Through Web sites,
mass e-mailings and chat rooms, with little effort leaders
such as bin Laden can easily reach out into any country
and find recruits ready to give their lives for his cause.
Terrorists and hate groups can also use the Web to dis-
seminate their beliefs and information quickly and di-
rectly to the public, bypassing traditional news media
avenues altogether.45 In 1995, the Anti-Defamation
League reported that numerous U.S. based right-wing
groups were using the Net for recruitment, including the
Neo-Nazi National Alliance, anti-Semitic "Identity"
churches and a variety of Ku Klux Klan organizations.46
While the dissemination of information is not only
used to recruit, it should be mentioned that the Internet
is now being harnessed to spread the capabilities of
achieving bloodshed to anyone with access to a computer.
Many believe that the recent increase in terrorist bomb-
ings over the last few years is to a large extent, attribut-
able to the amount of readily available information on the
Web teaching how to create highly effective explosives.47
In the case of the Oklahoma City bombing, only hours af-
ter Timothy McVeigh blew up the Alfred P. Murrah Fed-
eral Building in 1994, killing 168 people, an anonymous
source posted detailed instructions, including a diagram,
on how to construct a similar fertilizer bomb.4" Another
42. See Tom Regan, When Terrorists Turn to the Internet:
Seemingly Unconnected Events May Have a More Sinister Source:
Coordinated, Cyber-Hacker Attacks, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 1,
1999, at407. See Vise & Adams, supra note 9, at A3.
44. Kaur, supra note 41, at 78 (citing Mike Caldrick, a bomb tech-
nician and anti-terrorist expert at Scotland Yard).
45. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, TERRORIST ACTITIES ON THE
INTERNET (1998), available at http://www.adl.org/Terror/focus/
16_focusa.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
46. Forster, supra note 38, at 47.
47. See Kaur, supra note 40, at 78-79.
48. Id.
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site discussed how the McVeigh bomb could have been
improved and more devastating.49 Recent searches on the
Web have come up with bomb making information on eve-
rything from "calcium carbide bomb[s]" to "chemical fire
bottle[s]." 0 In this regard, terrorism has been transform-
ing. No longer are we dealing with a war of people, but
information war, where the Internet plays a key role in
making everything from detailed on-line maps to informa-
tion on sarin gas easily available."'
The Internet has also greatly improved the financ-
ing capabilities of terrorist organizations, primarily in the
realm of money transfers and on-line banking via the
Internet." With electronic, instant transfers, terrorist
groups can gain financial support from any source. From
a central command post and laptop, leaders like bin
Laden have the ability to fund individual terrorist cells
from his own inherited wealth,53 and from private or state
donations made to his account. Independent cells can now
receive the funds they need to carry out terrorist attacks
almost instantly, leaving little time for law enforcement
to follow a "money trail."
Combining the previous three advancements, re-
cent Net capabilities have further created a new type of
terrorism that has yet to be effectively countered - "cyber-
terrorism." ' Due to its ease of coordination, extreme ef-
fectiveness and anonymity, cyber-terrorism has become
an attractive alternative to traditional action over the
past few years, as it inflicts great damage with little harm
to the attacker.55 So extreme is this threat, that cyber-
terrorism has become one of the two top post-Cold War
problems facing the world today, second only to organized
crime. The Pentagon alone receives 2,500,000 hacking
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 79.
53. He received part of a $5 billion inheritance from his father, a
Saudi construction and oil magnate. Weiner, supra note 36, at Al.
54. It is defined as any person or group that "alters, destructs or
acquires on line information with the intent to cause harm to the public."
Kaur, supra note 41, at 80.
55. See Regan, supra note 42, at 17.
56. Kaur, supra note 41, at 80.
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attempts each year.5 ' Due to "[o]ur growing dependence on
computer networks and telecommunications" the U.S. has
become "increasingly vulnerable to possible cyber attacks
against such targets as military war rooms, power plants,
telephone networks, air traffic control centers and
banks."8
The Internet is now being used not just as a means
of creating a terrorist strike, but as a launch weapon it-
self." Targets of the future are more likely to be corporate
information structures as opposed to governmental, as
evidenced in the recent cyber attack on Yahoo. Internet
worms like "Worm.Explore Zip" created havoc in com-
puter e-mail systems around the world, but particularly
at corporations like Microsoft, Intel and NBC. 60 From a
small apartment in the Philippines, the "I Love You" virus
caused millions of dollars in damage worldwide by invad-
ing hard drives via Internet e-mail.6' The FBI estimates
such electronic intrusions to cause roughly $10 billion in
damages every year within the United States alone.62 As
more and more companies take advantage of the informa-
tion superhighway and modernize their communications
systems, such targets become increasingly attractive.
While technology and communication advances can in-
crease corporate profits and establish better defense, they
also assist potential enemies in improving their capabili-
ties to attack.63
57. Id.
58. Freeh, supra note 12. See also Kerr-Senate, supra note 40 (Cy-
ber attacks to shut down critical national infrastructure such as energy, tele-
communications, transportation or government operations for the purpose of
coercing or intimidating a government or civilian population is emerging as a
very real threat.).
59. See Regan, supra note 42, at 18 (citing "Countering the New
Terrorism" survey by the Rand Corp.); John Arquilla & David Rondfeldt,
Cyberwar is Coming! in IN ATHENA'S CAMP: PREPARING FOR CONFLICT IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 23, 49 (1997).
60. Regan, supra note 42, at 18.
61. George Cole, 'I Love You' Can Really Hurt, THE TIMES
EDUCATIONAL SUPP. June 9, 2000, at 6, available at
http://www.tes.co.uk/search/search display.asp?section=Archive&subsection
=Online+Education&id=335588&Type=O (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
62. Vernon J. Ehlers, Information Warfare and International Secu-
rity, OFFICER, Sep. 1, 1999, at 30.
63. See id.
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C. The Stakes Have Changed - A Need for Action in Inter-
net Surveillance
A heightened capability through instantaneous Inter-
net connections is not the only problem facing U.S. and
global security in the new century; in fact, it is merely
half the equation. What must be realized are the lethal
capabilities of modern international terrorist organiza-
tions, when recent technological advances in communica-
tion are linked with weapons of mass destruction. Once
an issue only debated, many in law enforcement, intelli-
gence and the armed forces now treat as fact the expecta-
tion that a terrorist group will use either a nuclear,
chemical or biological weapon against the United States
in the near future.'
The recent trend in terrorism has been directed to-
ward more large-scale incidents designed for maximum
destruction, terror and media impact, putting more
Americans at risk than ever before." In the last five
years, the U.S. has seen a dramatic increase in the num-
ber of validated threats to use such agents.66 In particular,
the FBI has seen an increase in interest for biological
agents by white supremacist and other domestic terrorist
groups.67 In 1997 for example, conspirators in a white su-
premacist organization pled guilty to planning to explode
tanks containing hydrogen sulfide, a deadly industrial
chemical, as a diversion to their armored car robbery."
Recently, authorities foiled a terrorist plot in the South-
ern U.S., uncovering a group planning to blow up power
transmission facilities to be downloading off the Web in-
formation concerning Ricin, the third most deadly toxin in
the world.69 To better demonstrate the grave effects of
even a limited chemical attack, one must only examine
the 1995 nerve gas attack launched by the Japanese cult
64. See Freeh, supra note 12.
65. Id.
66. See Bremmer, supra note 12, at 29-30.
67. See Freeh, supra note 12.
68. Id.
69. See Kerr-Senate, supra note 40.
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Aum Shrinrikyo upon the Tokyo subway system, killing
twelve and sickening 5,000.70
Primarily, these new threats are due to the ease of
acquiring weapons of mass destruction.71 Nuclear prolif-
eration has not only spread such weapons around the
world, but some economically devastated countries such
as Russia, with 30,000 war heads scattered across 100
sites, have questionable means of preventing their theft.72
With a mentality that "everything is for sale," none of the
key facilities in the former Soviet Union that hold weap-
ons-usable nuclear material has adequate safeguards and
security.73 Chemical and biological weapons can also be
easily manufactured or obtained, even within the United
States.4
As terrorist cells diffuse from a central command
post, weapons are assembled from different regions and
routes of attack into the United States come from any-
where, the U.S. must take action in developing Internet
surveillance capabilities. There can be little disagreement
that an attack using weapons of mass destruction,
planned, controlled and even executed through the bene-
fits of the advancing Internet and communication tech-
nology could be devastating. We must be able to do a bet-
ter job identifying terrorists and their plans, possess bet-
ter intelligence collection techniques and have the ability
to share and disseminate information on potential
threats.75 As technology has advanced greatly over the
past decade to benefit all our lives, so must our capabili-
ties of dealing with the evolving effects of those advance-
ments." As the Internet honeymoon period is over, the
electronic 21st century must witness the combination of
updated counter-terrorism devices and new communica-
tion standards, in an attempt to safeguard privacy, while
70. See Nicholas D. Kristof, At Trial in Tokyo, Guru Says Aim was
to Give 'Ultimate Joy,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996, at All.
71. See Freeh, supra note 12.
72. Graham Allison, Nuclear Dangers: Fear Increases of Terrorists
Getting Hands on 'Loose' Warheads as Security Slips, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19,
1997, at Cl.
73. Id.
74. See Freeh, supra note 12.
75. See Bremmer, supra note 12, at 29-31.
76. See Forster, supra note 38, at 48.
258 [Vol. XXVII: 1
INTERNET SURVEILLANCE
gaining equal footing with terrorists who have raised the
stakes through weaponry and communication capabilities.
IV. THE CURRENT MERGER OF U.S. LAw AND CARNIVORE
A balance must be struck between countering the
increase in widespread multi-organizational terrorist
networks, who are keenly adept at using advanced tech-
nology for both communications as well as munitions, and
the grave danger that that response may be used to re-
strict the ambit of privacy and personal liberty that is at
the very center of liberal societies. After all, it is that type
of society that is the real target of the international ter-
rorism. While it is often the case that unsettled times may
tempt government officials to sacrifice individual rights in
the name of national security," the current situation of
international terrorism we are now facing shows no sign
of remaining only for a short while, a sudden flash in the
pan that reactionaries jump at, but more of a new fact of
life facing the new century. In the fight to achieve a com-
fortable medium against this steadily growing threat, the
U.S. is currently attempting to fit Carnivore into a web of
differing laws.
A. U.S. Law Addressing Terrorism, Surveillance and Pri-
vacy
The recent trend in the U.S. has been to address
the new level of Internet threats head on. The need for
striking a balance between the Bill of Rights and national
security, however, dates back to the earliest days of the
new republic." The Alien and Sedition Acts were designed
in many ways to deal with the 18h century version of
77. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("History teaches that grave threats
to liberty often come in times or urgency, when constitutional rights seem too
extravagant to endure."); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN
SocIETY 4 (1992) ([It is a natural reflex to penalize speech perceived as in-
imical to national security, social order, or public civility.").
78. See The Alien Act of June 25, 1798, 1 Stat. 570; The Alien Act of
July 6, 1798, 1 Stat. 577; The Sedition Act of July 14, 1789, 1 Stat. 596.
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modern day terrorism facing the fledgling nation. 9 The
second attempt by Congress, as a reaction to the world-
wide turmoil leading up to World War I, came in 1917
with the Espionage Act.8" Under this Act, jail sentences
would now be assessed for participation in a conspiracy,
8 1
violently interfering with foreign commerce"' and counter-
feiting. 3 Despite the many First Amendment challenges
to the Act, the Supreme Court interpreted the internal
benefits to be of greater value than free speech concerns.'"
The next attempt came in 1978 with the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA").8" The law provides
regularized procedures for obtaining electronic surveil-
lance warrants for foreign intelligence investigations for
national security purposes.86 For the first time, specifi-
cally included as "foreign powers" are groups engaged in
87Finternational terrorism. Under FISA, the government
must obtain a court order before electronic surveillance
can proceed against a U.S. person within the country's
borders. With approval of the Attorney General, applica-
tion is made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court. 8 If probable cause exists that the target of the sur-
veillance is a foreign power, the warrant will be issued. In
reviewing the application, the government must outline
its minimization procedures which "limit acquisition, re-
tention and dissemination of information concerning U.S.
persons which is not publicly available. 89 Under judicial
review, the courts have ruled that FISA's issuance of a
warrant authorizing electronic surveillance complied with
79. See Thomas C. Martin, The Comprehensive Terrorism Preven-
tion Act of 1995, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 201, 207 (1996).
80. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, Pub. L. No. 24, ch. 30, 40 Stat.
217 (1917).
81. Id. tit. I, § 4.
82. Id. tit. IV, § 1.
83. Id. tit. V, § 2.
84. See, e.g., Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1918);
Schenk v. United States, 250 U.S. 47 (1919); and Abrams et al. v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
85. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§
1801-29 (1994).
86. Id. §§ 1801-11.
87. Id. § 1801(a).
88. Id. § 1804.
89. Id. § 1801(h).
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the procedural safeguards required by the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution, protecting individuals
from unreasonable searches and seizures in criminal in-
vestigations. 90 The standards under FISA for the issuance
of court orders were also found reasonable. 91
Dangers of the Internet and the heightened threat
of terrorism on American soil began to enter the mix in
1995. Following the World Trade Center and Oklahoma
City bombings, the Senate passed the Comprehensive
Terrorist Prevention Act.92 Sponsored by Senate Majority
Leader Robert Dole (R-Kans.), it created the new federal
crime of international terrorism, broadened the federal
jurisdiction over terrorist offenses, authorized "roving
wiretaps" that could follow a suspect over numerous
phone lines, simplified deportation of aliens linked to ter-
rorism, prohibited donations to terrorist organizations,
increased FBI access to credit reports and enhanced the
pre-emptive striking power of law enforcement to stop
terrorist violence before it occurred.93 Most importantly
however, for the first time Congress began to recognize
the role, albeit a fledgling one in 1995, of the Internet in
effecting terrorist attacks. During debate on the bill,
Senator Barbara Feinstein (D-Cal.) proposed amendment
number 1209 that would make it unlawful to intention-
ally distribute information by any means, pertaining to
the manufacture of explosives, to someone who is going to
use it to commit a federal offense. 94 In illustrating the
need for such an amendment, the Senator read several
passages from the Terrorist Handbook, an "invaluable
guide to having a good time" in using chemical products to
90. United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1313 (E.D.N.Y.
1982). See also United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 69 (2nd Cir. 1984)
(Members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army fell within FISA's foreign
power definition as a group engaged in international terrorism).
91. See Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1313.
92. Comprehensive Terrorist Prevention Act of 1995, S. 735, 104th
Cong. (1995) [hereinafter CTPA]. The bill passed on June 7, 1995 by a vote of
91-8. 141 CoNG. REC. S7880 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
93. Holly Idelson, Details ofAnti-Terrorism Proposals, 53 CONG. Q.
1178 (Apr. 29, 1995).
94. See 141 CONG. REc. S7684 (daily ed. June 5, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Feinstein). The amendment was based in part on 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)
making it a federal offense to knowingly or intentionally teach or demon-
strate the use, application or making of an explosive that will be unlawfully
employed for use in or in furtherance of a civil disorder. Id.
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blow up buildings, which she downloaded from the Inter-
net.95 After only mild debate," the amendment, geared to
the content and source of the message, was passed as part
of the bill.97
Unfortunately, only the House version of the bill,
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA") ever passed both houses and became law.98
AEDPA enhanced the ability of the U.S. government to
respond to terrorist threats. Section 302 authorizes the
Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Attorney Gen-
eral and Secretary of the Treasury, to designate as foreign
terrorist organizations those groups that meet certain
specific criteria.99 Once this designation is applied, finan-
cial contributions are illegal.'0 Such a provision has been
received within the law enforcement community as be-
coming an "invaluable tool" in disrupting the fundraising
capabilities of international terrorist groups.'' A watered
down version of its Senate counterpart, the AEDPA could
still have gone much further in taking effective steps to-
wards eliminating terrorist threats from abroad.'
0 2
95. 141 CONG. REC. S7682 (daily ed. June 5, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Feinstein).
96. See 141 CONG. REC. S7686 (daily ed. June 5, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Hatch).
97. See CTPA tit. IX, § 901.
98. See 142 CONG. REC. H3618 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (passed in
the House by a vote of 293-133); 142 CONG. REC. S3477 (daily ed. Apr. 17,
1996) (passed the Senate by a vote of 91-8).
99. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-132, sec. 302(a), § 1189, 110 Stat. 1248.
100. Id sec. 303(a), § 2339B, 110 Stat. 1250 ("Whoever ... knowingly
provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or
attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not
more than 10 years, or both.").
101. Freeh, supra note 12.
102. Proposals to expand law enforcement powers in gaining credit
reports and information on a suspect's business records were not included.
Additionally, the original bill would have added terrorism-related offenses to
the list the FBI may obtain approval to intercept wire or oral communica-
tions. See Blown Away? The Bill of Rights After Oklahoma City, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 2074, 2084-87 (1996).
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B. Carnivore and its Application
Within the FBI and law enforcement community,
the realization was made in the mid-1990's that, on the
intergovernmental plane, we must project and plan to
forestall or respond adequately to possible terrorist disas-
ters that while not necessarily assigned a high probability
of occurrence, are expected.'M For if they were to occur,
the degree of injury would be deemed unacceptable either
because it is irreparable or because of its projected politi-
cal, social or economic costs. Due to the ever-growing de-
pendence on high-tech industry and science-based sys-
tems, we must develop our capacities for "proacting" or
"prosponding" to the dangers of international terrorism,
rather than merely "reacting" or "responding."...
The classic method of such an anticipatory re-
sponse to terrorism is intelligence gathering.' In modern
constitutional democracies, this is an acutely sensitive
issue as the potential for infringing on privacy is often a
great Concern. With existing terrorism, privacy and com-
munication laws in place, intelligence agencies within the
U.S. began pushing for more fumding to conduct surveil-
lance of Internet communications, to protect the nation's
infrastructure from "information warfare."'6 The Carni-
103. See generally W. Michael Reisman, New Scenarios of Threats to
International Peace and Security: Developing Legal Capacities for Adequate
Responses, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: NEW
SCENARIOS-NEW LAW? 13 (Jost Delbruck ed., 1993).
104. Id.
105. See Reisman, supra note 14, at 15. Other anticipatory yet less
active responses by the U.S. and international community include tagging
explosive materials to make their detection easier, regulating the sale of
highly dangerous chemical and nuclear materials and multilateral conven-
tions. Id. at 20-23. See also, G.A. Res. 51/210, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 51st
Sess., 88th plen. mtg., at 3(b), U.N. Doc. A151/631 (1996) (Measures to Elimi-
nate International Terrorism); Convention on the Marketing of Plastic Explo-
sives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 726; Organization
of American States: Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufac-
turing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other
Related Materials, Nov. 14, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 145; Convention on the Prohibi-
tion of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio-
logical) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 583.
106. DAVID BANISAR, PRIVACY & HUMAN RIGHTS 2000: AN
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF PRIVACY LAWS AND DEVELOPMENTS 232 (2000). Elec-
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yore Diagnostic Tool, currently "Carnivore," was designed
and developed by the FBI as an increasing number of
criminal subjects turned to the Internet for communica-
tions with each other, producing a need for better digital
discrimination in the surveillance of these transmissions
where communication channels and addresses are often
shared."7 The program was originally conceived under the
name "Omnivore" in February 1997, and later replaced in
June 1999 by Carnivore, running on a Windows NT-based
operating system. 0 8 Because many Internet Service Pro-
viders ("ISPs") lacked the ability to discriminate between
communications in identifying a particular subject's mes-
sages to the exclusion of all others, the FBI developed
Carnivore. The device provides the law enforcement
agency with a "surgical" ability to intercept and collect
communications with a warrant, while ignoring all other
information transfers. 9 As the FBI describes it, Carni-
vore will work much like commercial "sniffers" and other
network diagnostic tools used by ISPs regularly, except it
will have the ability to distinguish between communica-
tions that may be lawfully intercepted and those that may
not." ' Basically a network analyzer, it runs as an applica-
tion program on a normal personal computer ("PC"). It
works by "sniffing" the proper portions of network "pack-
ets" (the standard unit of Internet traffic)' and copying
and storing only those that match a finely defined filter
set, programmed in conformity with the court order.' 2 The
Electronic surveillance communication is viewed by the FBI as one of the
most important capabilities for acquiring evidence to prevent serious crime
(use of a suspects own words). See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PROGRAMS
AND INITIATIVES, CARNIVORE DIAGNOSTIC TOOL at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/
carnivore/carnivore2.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter CARNIVORE
DIAGNOSTIC TOOL].
107. Kerr-House, supra note 11, at 13.
108. Press Release, Electronic Privacy Information Center, FBI Re-
leases Carnivore Documents to EPIC: Privacy Group Says Disclosure Insuffi-
cient (Oct. 2, 2000), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/foiapr.html.
109. See CARNIVORE DIAGNOSTIC TOOL, supra note 106.
110. Id.
111. FBI to Release Carnivore Documents, USA TODAY (Aug. 17,
2000), at http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cti411.htm.
112. Kerr-House, supra note 11, at 13. For example, if a court order
pertains to surveillance of e-mail only, Carnivore can be configured to exclude
all others such as Web browsing. As a sniffer, it selects messages based on
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device requires not only a court order, but also knowledge
and assistance of ISP personnel for installation."'
For Carnivore surveillance, along with FISA war-
rants, interception of criminal wire and electronic com-
munications are authorized under Title III of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Title
III"), as amended by the Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA").14 Congress passed Title III in
response to the Supreme Court's holding in 1967, that
wiretapping is a search and seizure, and that telephone
conversations are entitled to protection under the Fourth
Amendment.1 5 As evidence of the speed in which technol-
ogy can quickly make congressional action obsolete, Con-
gress further amended Title III to include electronic com-
munications in 1986 after a 1978 4th Circuit case, United
States v. Seidlitz, established that the interception of a
computer transmission was not contemplated by the
original statute's concern with "wire communication" of
an "aural acquisition."1 16
To view a communication's content, applications
under Title III must state the offense being committed,
place from which communications are to be intercepted,
description of the types of conversations to be intercepted
and identity of the persons anticipated to be inter-
cepted. 17 The surveillance procedure also provides for
some judicial oversight, limiting court orders to thirty
days and requiring both periodic reports every seven to
ten days during the surveillance, and justification for or-
der extensions up to thirty days."8 Upon the expiration of
the intercept period, the communications must be pre-
sented to a judge and sealed. Even further, annual reports
must be published on the number and nature of wiretaps.
Only in cases of emergency can surveillance be permitted
criteria expressly set out in the court order, such as e-mails transmitted to
and from a particular account or user. Id. at 14.
113. Id. at 14.
114. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2711 (1994) [hereinafter ECPA].
115. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
116. United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 156-57 (4th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979).
117. ECPA § 2518.
118. Id.
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to proceed immediately with authorization from high-level
Department of Justice ("DOJ") officials, as long as a court
order is filed within forty-eight hours."9
The ECPA amendments specifically extended
statutory legal protection to wire and electronic communi-
cations, but on a 1986 basis when the Internet was just
coming into common use and e-mail was barely used by
the public. Statutory privacy protection was further cre-
ated for "transactional records" of electronic communica-
tions, such as addressing, routing and billing, but no-
where do the laws come close to mentioning modern day
e-mail.2 ° In order for the FBI to view these types of re-
cords, an ECPA court order is necessary under Sections
3122-23Y.12 To view the communication's actual content, a
Title III (probable-cause based) order is used, as under
Section 2703(a), and only those communications stored for
over 180 days are readable by the FBI.
122
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3121, the FBI is permitted to use
"technology reasonably available to it" to conduct elec-
tronic surveillance.'23 While the technology of commercial
sniffers at the time worked well, they were designed nei-
ther with deference to privacy rights nor as a law en-
forcement surveillance tool. 24 These detractions created
shortcomings in the FBI's battle to combat acts of terror-
ism, threats to national security and cyber-crimes, pri-
marily in the inability to distinguish between different
communications. Like a funnel, everything that went
through the sniffer was decoded without prejudice. What
was needed was a device capable of filtering with preci-
sion certain electronic computer traffic like binary code,
enabling government personnel to receive and view only
119. Id.
120. ECPA § 2703(c)-(d).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3122-23 (1994). Here, the ECPA adopted the pen
register and trap and trace statute, governing real-time interception of the
numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on a phone line. The pen register
collects the electronic impulses that identify the number dialed, and the trap
and trace device collects the originating number for incoming calls. This type
of court order was first introduced under Title III for telephone communica-
tions. See Dempsey, supra note 30, at 23.
122. ECPA § 2703(a).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (1994).
124. See Kerr-Senate, supra note 40.
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those specified communications as pertaining to the Sec-
tion 3121 or Title III order.
125
With this in mind, the tool, described by Marcus
Thomas, head of the FBI's Cyber-Tech Section as nothing
more than a PC with proprietary software,' 21 is still not
always necessary. If an ISP is capable of "completely,
properly, and securely" complying with a court order for
interception of a suspect's communication or account in-
formation, Carnivore is not deployed. 12 7 In the case of
EarthLink Inc., the Atlanta based ISP serving 4.2 million
subscribers nationwide, as they possess the ability to
comply with a court order, they reached an agreement
with the FBI to do all surveillance themselves without the
128
use of Carnivore.
If Carnivore is used, however, it is installed with
the cooperation and technical assistance of the ISP tech-
nicians, via a bridging device, so that it can be positioned
exclusively upon the small segment of network traffic
where the subject's communications are directed. 129 Once
deployed, Carnivore's first task is to filter a portion of an
ISP's high-speed network traffic, or binary code, looking
for the particular identifying information of the criminal
subject. If detected, the packets of the subject's commu-
nication are segregated for further filtering and storage
according to the specific warrant. All other binary code
that passed through the filter is neither recorded nor
saved by the FBI.'' Only after electronic filtering does the
information leave the device in human readable form for
FBI analysis. Current upgrades are also adding an integ-
rity feature by imprinting on the readable communication
the collection mode being used. 32 As the FBI intends, this
will demonstrate that no alteration has been made to the
filter settings.
125. Id.
126. FBI E-Mail Snooping Sparks Controversy, USA TODAY (July 13,
2000), at http'/www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cti213.htm.
127. Kerr-Senate, supra note 40.
128. See EarthLink Dodges FBI's Carnivore, USA TODAY (July 14,
2000), at http'//www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cti231.htm.
129. See Kerr-Senate, supra note 40.
130. See Ted Bridis & Neil King, Jr., Carnivore E-Mail Tool Won't
Eat Up Privacy, Says FBI, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2000, at A28.,
131. See Kerr-Senate, supra note 40.
132. Id.
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Carnivore employs new technology to counter the
growing threats of the Information Age. It is currently
being argued that privacy rights will remain protected by
the same judicial oversight that has applied effectively for
the last thirty years. 13 But as will discussed later, the
time has come for the U.S. to adopt a new set of Internet
privacy laws that set out surveillance guidelines based on
modern 21st century technology and understanding, not
via 1968, 1978 and 1986 standards. To its credit, Carni-
vore has only been used sparingly, in cases where an ISP
itself cannot undertake the surveillance effectively, which
explains why as of July 2000, Carnivore had only been
deployed twenty-five times between 1998 and 2000,
mainly for terrorist investigations. 3 4 In response to those
who began ringing the alarm a few years ago, warning of
the implications of undetectable criminal and interna-
tional terrorist activity, Carnivore will now attempt to
respond and fill that gap. '35 A gap still remains, however,
in governing Carnivore via laws that are designed with
modern international terrorist threats, capabilities and
technologies in mind. To repair this, the U.S. must turn
its attention to the U.K.'s RIPA for guidance.
V. THE BRITISH ADVANCEMENTS WITH RIPA
Europe has viewed privacy as an important issue
for hundreds of years. As early as 1361, the Justices of the
Peace Act in England provided for the arrest of peeping
toms and eavesdroppers.'36 Parliamentarian William Pitt
wrote in 1763, "The poorest man may in his cottage bid
defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be frail; its
roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storms
may enter; the rain may enter - but the King of England
133. See Letter from John E. Collingwood, Assistant Director, Office
of Public and Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to
Brian Gallagher, Editor of the Editorial Page, USA Today (July 24, 2000),
available at http://www.fbi.govhq/lab/carnivore/letterl.htm.
134. Id.
135. See Andrew W. Yung, Regulating the Genie: Effective Wiretaps
in the Information Age, 101 DICK. L. REV. 95, 98-100 (1996).
136. Justices of the Peace Act, 1361, 34 Edw. 3, c. 1 (Eng.).
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cannot enter."'37 This trend continued into the 20th cen-
tury as Europe enacted the first data protection laws. 3 ' In
the modern era, international bodies such as the United
Nations, Council of Europe and European Union ("EU")
have continued the trend in listing privacy as a human
right. From these international conventions, Great Brit-ain enacted RIPA to both deal with changes in technology
and extend a tradition of privacy protection for the Inter-
net.
A. International Privacy Protection in Europe
In its Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
United Nations made it a point at its formation in 1948 to
include privacy as a fundamental human right. Article 12
specifically states: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspon-
dence, nor to attack upon his honor and reputation. Eve-
ryone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attack."3 9 The Council of Europe fol-
lowed those same sentiments on the continent in the Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms ("Convention on Human Rights"). In
Article 8, Member States agreed that:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as in accor-
dance with the law and is necessary in a democratic so-
ciety in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the pre-
vention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.14
Both the European Commission of Human Rights
137. BANISAR, supra note 106, at 5.
138. See DAVID FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE
SociETIEs (1989).
139. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 71,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
140. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230 [hereinafter
Convention].
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and the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") en-
force the articles of the Convention on Human Rights.
Holding privacy to be an important right, the ECHR has
consistently viewed the protections of Article 8 broadly
and interpreted the reservations narrowly."' If a Member
State such as the U.K. fails to impose wiretapping regula-
tions, sanctions will be ordered."' Also drafted by the
Council of Europe in 1980 was the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development Guidelines Govern-
ing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows
of Personal Data. 143 Under these guidelines, specific rules
for the handling of personal information must be enacted
by each Member State. Personal data must be obtained
fairly and lawfully, used only for original specified pur-
poses, must be accurate, accessible to the subject, kept
secure and destroyed after its purpose is complete.
14 4
The EU has also weighed in on privacy in recent
years. In the Data Protection Directives of 1995 and 1997,
the EU sought to harmonize laws throughout its Member
States to ensure consistent levels of protection for citizens
and allow for the free flow of personal information.145 Ba-
sic personal privacy guidelines were extended, and spe-
141. See Karen C. Burke, Secret Surveillance and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1113, 1122 (1981).
142. See BANISAR, supra note 106, at 7.
143. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Council Recommendation Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data, Sept. 23, 1980, OECD
Doc. C (80) 58, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422.
144. See id. The Council of Europe also adopted Recommendation
No. R (99) 5 in February 1999, outlining the guidelines for the protection of
individuals with regard to the collection and processing of personal data on
information highways (applies mostly to ISPs and Internet safety concerns
for users). Council of Europe, Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation No. R
(99) 5 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States for the Protection of
Privacy on the Internet, adopted Feb. 23, 1999 at the 660th meeting of the
Ministers' Deputies, available at http://www.coe.fr/dataprotection/red elig-
nes.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
145. See generally Council Directive 95/46 of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Coun-
cil Directive 95/46]; Council Directive 97/66 of 15 December 1997 Concerning
the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Tele-
communications Sector, 1998 O.J. (L 24) 1 [hereinafter Council Directive
97/66].
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cifically, the Directive Concerning the Processing of Per-
sonal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Telecom-
munications Sector ("Directive 97/66") gave specific pro-
tections covering telecommunication networks. 46 The Pro-
tection Directives mainly deal with the right to know
what data is being kept about you and further strength-
ens protections for sensitive personal data. One of the
specific requirements is the creation of a data protection
commissioner or "supervisory authority" within each
Member State. 1 7 The commissioner's role is to consult
with the government on legislation, conduct investiga-
tions of privacy violations, hear complaints and begin le-
gal proceedings in cases of violations.4 1 With these inter-
national directives and provisions in mind, the U.K. en-
acted RIPA.
B. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
While RIPA replaces a number of older British tele-
communication and law enforcement laws, two privacy
laws are also in effect. The Human Rights Act 1998
('T"") incorporates the Convention on Human Rights
into domestic law and establishes an enforceable right toprivacy.1 The Data Protection Act 1998 updates the older
Data Protection Act 1984 in accordance with the require-
ments of the EU's Data Protection Directives."5 ° It ensures
limitations on the use of personal information and is en-
forced by the independent Office of the Data Protection
Commissioner. 5'
By 1999, British officials were reaching the same
conclusions the FBI had a few years previous, that terror-
ists and criminal elements were turning to the Internet in
droves to plan, communicate and carry out their crimes.
Needing a step-up from telecommunication laws that
were as old as the U.S.'s ECPA, the combination of a dras-
tic improvement in technology and the guarantee of pri-
vacy rights in the HRA were the "twin drivers" for the
146. See Council Directive 97/66, supra note 145, arts. 2(c)-(d), 4-6.
147. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 145, art. 28.
148. Id.
149. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
150. Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (Eng.).
151. Id. § 51.
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RIPA campaign."' Receiving Royal Assent on July 28,
2000, Home Secretary Jack Straw described the bill as
playing a "crucial role in helping law enforcement agen-
cies combat drug trafficking, terrorism and other serious
crime.' 53
At its most basic, the benefit of RIPA is that in
great detail, the law outlines the legal boundaries and ob-
ligations in modern Internet interception and surveil-
lance. The law speaks directly to ISPs and the issues that
make Web intercepts different from telephone wiretap-
ping. Part I of RIPA repeals the Interception of Communi-
cations Act 1985 and provides a new regime for intercep-
tion of communications in light of recent technological ad-
vancements.5  Further, it incorporates Article 5 of Direc-
tive 97/66 requiring Member States to safeguard the con-
fidentiality of communications.
1 55
Section 1 creates the offense of unlawful intercep-
tion of any communication that is being transmitted via
telecommunication systems or the postal service. '56 This
applies to "intercepted materials," or more specifically,
the actual contents of the communication itself. 1 7 In order
to lawfully intercept an Internet communication, either
consent (including interception within the operation of the
ISP services) or an "interception warrant" is required.1 8
The penalty for violation of Part I is two years imprison-
ment and a civil fine of £5,000. For law enforcement agen-
cies to obtain an interception warrant, an application
must be made directly to the Secretary of State showing
an electronic interception is necessary and the "conduct
152. James Middleton, Encryption at the Mercy of the Law, NETWORK
NEWS (February 28, 2000), at http//www.vnunet.com/Analysis/107421 (quot-
ing Home Sec. Jack Straw).
153. Police Powers Expanded for Tapping of Wireless Internet (June
23, 1999), at http://www.vnunet.com/News/85638.
154. See Explanatory Notes to Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
2000, T1 8, at http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en/2000en23.htm (last
visited Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Explanatory Notes].
155. Id. 9.
156. See RIPA, 2000, c. 29, § I (Eng.). "Telecommunications system"
specifically covers communications transmitted via the use of "electrical or
electro-magnetic energy." Id. § 2(1).
157. Id. § 20.
158. Id. §§ 3-5.
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authorized by the warrant is proportionate to what is
sought to be achieved by that conduct."159 A warrant can
only be deemed necessary by the Secretary for the same
reasons as set out in Article 8 of the Convention on Hu-
man Rights, that the e-mail interception is in the inter-
ests of national security, the prevention of serious crime
or for the safeguarding of economic well being.160 If for
economic well being, a warrant is only necessary when
the information relates to acts or intentions of persons
outside the U.K.'
61
To be effective, all warrants must name one person
as the interception subject or the set of premises to be in-
tercepted.' The specific type of communication to be in-
tercepted must also be laid out, including any addresses,
numbers or other factors that will be used in identifying
the communication to be intercepted, such as name of the
sender or receiver. 63 With this information, the Secretary
of State is required to authorize a certificate describing
the material that may be intercepted by law enforcement.
Only that information contained in the certificate may
legally be viewed."6 A warrant issued in the interest of
national security will remain effective for six months, and
with cause, renewal is possible. 65 The Secretary of State
may also modify the description of material interceptable
if necessary.'66
To implement the warrant, either the law enforce-
ment agency or the ISP itself will be authorized to con-
duct the surveillance. 67 An ISP's failure to comply fully
with the request is a convictable offense. 16 Further, all
ISPs and law enforcement personnel are prevented from
disclosing any knowledge of the warrant, interceptions or
the information contained in any communication. 69 Brit-
ish ISPs will now be required to maintain a "reasonable"
159. Id. § 5.
160. Compare id. with Convention, supra note 140, at 230.
161. RIPA § 5.
162. See id. § 8.
163. See id. at (2-3).
164. See Explanatory Notes, supra note 154, at [ 79.
165. RIPA § 9.
166. Id. § 10(1)(b).
167. Id. § 11.
168. Id. § 11(7).
169. Id. § 19.
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surveillance and interception capability.7 ° Lacking a Car-
nivore type system, British law enforcement will be forced
to rely on the less sophisticated and discriminating com-
mercial sniffers available to ISPs. In the U.S., such a pro-
vision may be unnecessary with the FBI's diagnostic tool,
but the benefit of a clear statute creating a duty amongst
ISPs to assist in effective interceptions of the target's
communications cuts to the heart of the matter.
Once information has been intercepted, strict re-
strictions are placed on its storage and handling. Distri-
bution and disclosure of the communication must be kept
to a minimum, and any copies made must be destroyed
once they are no longer necessary. 17 In the years ahead,
as investigations may begin to compile personal electronic
communications, it is in the interest of the suspect's pri-
vacy that her information be handled and maintained
carefully by law enforcement.
RIPA also makes the advancement of distinguish-
ing between interception of a communication's content
and interception of transactional information. Chapter II
of the Act applies to "communication data" or the address-
ing information at the top of an e-mail, excluding con-
tent. 172 As with content interception, such acquisition
must be deemed necessary. Those include interests of na-
tional security, prevention or detection of crime, economic
well-being, public safety, protecting public health and
preventing death in an emergency.17 1 Compared to the cri-
teria for sensitive e-mail content, circumstances have
been expanded whereby only addressing information can
be intercepted. Placing further protections on privacy, in
order to view addressing information, authorization must
be applied for as not only necessary but proportionate to
the conduct involved. 174 Once authorization is granted, an
ISP may be instructed, with notice, to disclose or obtain
the specific e-mail data. If unable to do so, compliance is
170. Id. § 12.
171. See RIPA § 15.
172. Id. § 21.
173. See id. § 22(2)(a-h).
174. Id. § 22(5).
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not required.'75 The authorization will remain effective for
one month.
While Part I specifically applies to the interception
of messages and transactional type data, Part II further
merges all possible types of law enforcement surveillance
into one compact law by creating a system of authoriza-
tions for physical "surveillance" and "covert human intel-
ligence." " Surveillance is broken down into two types:
"[D]irected" and "intrusive."'77 The former is defined as
covert surveillance in relation to a specific investigation
likely to result in obtaining private information about the
subject, and the later as covert surveillance in relation to
anything taking place on residential premises (usually by
surveillance apparatus).7 " Like communication data in-
terceptions, authorization applications to the Secretary of
State must prove the normal necessity and proportional-
ity.9 For surveillance, authorization may also be obtained
from officials within the National Criminal Intelligence
Service or the National Crime Squad.8 0 Overseeing these
authorizations is the Surveillance Commissioner who has
the power to "quash" or "cancel" any order.'8'
Part III of RIPA is by far the most radical and use-
ful to law enforcement in analyzing Internet intercep-
tions. It introduces a power to enable police, customs offi-
cials and members of the judiciary to serve notices on in-
dividuals or bodies requiring the disclosure of encrypted
information or messages, in order to maintain the effec-
tiveness of existing law enforcement powers in the face of
increasing criminal use of encryption."8 2 As the White
House recently announced safeguards on the most power-
ful types of encryption, this type of provision may be un-
necessary in the U.S."s Currently, U.S. export control pol-
icy limits those countries to which American manufactur-
175. See id. § 22(4).
176. Id. § 26.
177. RIPA § 26(1).
178. See id. § 26(2)-(5).
179. Id. § 26(3-4).
180. Id. § 33(1).
181. Id. § 37.
182. See Explanatory Notes, supra note 154, at I 225-27.
183. See Press Release, The White House, Administration An-
nounces New Approach to Encrytion (Sept. 16, 1999), available at
http'/www.epic.org/crypto/legislation/cesa/WH_release_9_16.html.
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ers may sell powerful data and voice-scrambling software
and products. After a one-time review by the government,
such security programs may be sold to foreign buyers in
approved countries, excluding those countries that sup-
port terrorism.8 4 The FBI also states that it has yet to en-
counter any encrypted messages via Carnivore surveil-
lance it could not decode. Such a provision, requiring that
citizens either turn over the "key" (a key, code, password,
algorithm or other data that allows access to the elec-
tronic data or facilitates the putting of the data into an
intelligible form) 8 ' they used in encoding the scrambled
message, or in the least providing law enforcement with a
plain text version of communications lawfully intercepted
or seized, 8 6 deals with privacy and surveillance issues the
FBI had no intention of addressing in its creation of Car-
nivore.
Examination of this provision by U.S. lawmakers
and enforcers is beneficial, however, in understanding the
overall new trends in effectively countering the growing
threats of Internet based terrorism and technical ad-
vancements in crime worldwide. Under Part II of RIPA,
disclosure can be required with "appropriate permission"
by high ranking national security officers if the encoded
communication is found "necessary" in the interests of
national security, prevention of crime and economic well
being of the country.'87 A notice to disclose can be served
on private citizens for their seized or intercepted commu-
nications, and corporations as well for their encrypted
files pertaining to an investigation.'88 These parties will
receive compensation for any costs incurred in disclosing
the requested information. 8 gFailure to comply, however,
184. Countries on the approved sale list include members of the EU,
Australia, Norway, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Japan, New Zealand
and Switzerland. "Terrorist nations" include Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan,
North Korea and Cuba. See Clinton Proposes Updated Wiretap Laws, USA
TODAY (July 17, 2000), at http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech.cti236.htm;
US Eases Restrictions on Overseas Sales of Encryption Products (September
17, 1999), at http://vnunet.com/News/90097.
185. RIPA§ 56.
186. Id. § 49.
187. Id. § 49(3).
188. Id. § 49.
189. Id. § 52.
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is a criminal offense. To preserve the covert nature of the
operation, any person notified by security services to turn
over a key or full text message is also barred from "tip-
ping-off' others as to the investigation.' 9
Wisely, Part IV of RIPA enacts a system of over-
sight and judicial review, as well as a forum for filing
complaints in the protection of privacy rights. Judicial
review is by far one of the greatest fears of American civil
libertarian groups in their opposition to Carnivore. 9 ' Sec-
tion 57 provides for the creation of a special Interception
of Communications Commissioner, who specifically over-
sees this new type of electronic surveillance and intercep-
tion. The Commissioner's duties include a review of: Ac-
tions by the Secretary of State, the interception and sur-
veillance regime, decryption notices and the adequacy of
current arrangements for the protection of intercepted
material . Second, Part IV creates the position of Chief
Surveillance Commissioner, whose role is to review the
use of surveillance, agents, informants, undercover offi-
cers, decryption notices and the arrangements for protect-
ing decryption keys to insure they remain within the
boundaries of RIPA.193 Finally, for the judicial oversight of
this Act, a special Tribunal is created." It will serve as
the new forum for complaints charging the government
with actions incompatible with the Convention on Human
Rights, complaints by anyone subject to use of investiga-
tory powers under RIPA and hold proceedings filed
against any intelligence service.'95 This assures a direct
avenue of recourse for anyone injured by the U.K.'s new
21st century electronic surveillance capabilities.
VI. WHAT THE U.S. CAN TAKE FROM RIPA
The time has come to address the emerging threats
of international terrorism through use of Carnivore. But
in making such advancements in electronic surveillance of
the expanding Internet, privacy rights and protection
190. Id. § 54.
191. See Dempsey, supra note 30, at 25.
192. See RIPA § 54.
193. Id.
194. See id. § 65.
195. Id.
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must also be given an update, bringing them in line with
current technological capabilities, standards and Internet
threats. The U.K. is the first amongst the common law
nations, and the world, to implement just such a change.
By adopting several of RIPA's protections, the U.S. must
harmonize existing privacy and surveillance law, cur-
rently covering three different avenues of obtaining taps
into one new law in line with the realistic capabilities of
the 21st century.
One of the most pressing needs for new regulation
in the U.S. is the growing fear of Carnivore concerning
protection of privacy. When word of the tool was an-
nounced in spring 2000, civil libertarians and many in
Congress began calling for a strengthening of privacy
laws as revolutionary changes in communication have left
current statutory protections outdated.'96 Of equal con-
cern, is that as Carnivore examines all network traffic
looking for its target, it has the potential to capture the
communications of those not subject to an order.'97 By fil-
tering out just the transmission information, Carnivore
still has the potential to capture the entire content of the
electronic message. 9 8 In an attempt to respond to these
fears, "'99 Attorney General Janet Reno announced in July
2000 that the technical specifications of the system would
20be reviewed by an independent outside group of experts.
In December 2000, the Illinois Institute of Technol-
ogy Research Institute ("IITRI") released its evaluation of
Carnivore version 1.3.4.201 As to the direct inquiries of the
196. See Dempsey, supra note 30, at 24-25; Ted Bridis, Congres-
sional Panel Debates Carnivore as FBI Moves to Mollify Privacy Worries,
WALL ST. J., July 25, 2000, at A24.
197. See Carnivore's Challenge to Privacy and Security Online: Hear-
ings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution,
106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Alan B. Davidson, Staff Counsel, Center for
Democracy and Technology), available at http://www.cdt.org/testimony/
000724davidson.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Davidson].
198. Id.
199. A recent study also found 87% of Americans were concerned
about their on-line privacy. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, SELF-REGULATION AND
PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (1999), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9907/privacy99.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
200. Reno to Accelerate 'Carnivore' Review, USA TODAY (August 4,
2000), at http://www.usatoday.comilife/cyber/tech/cti341.htm.
201. IIT RESEARCH INST., INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL REVIEW OF THE
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DOJ, the IITRI concluded that: When used in accordance
with a Title III court order, Carnivore provides investiga-
tors with only the permitted information; no operational
or security risks are posed to ISPs; Carnivore reduces, but
does not eliminate the risk of FBI agents acquiring unau-
thorized electronic communication information; and tak-
ing into account the high level of risks, Carnivore still re-
quires more protections.0 2 IITRrs general conclusions as
to broader concerns were that Carnivore is more effective
in protecting privacy than commercial sniffers, and while
FBI and DOJ policy require oversight, U.S. law has yet to
address it. 203 Further, Title III fails to extend statutory
suppression for illegal interception by FBI agents to elec-
tronic communications.0 4 Carnivore also lacks the "power
'to spy on almost everyone with an e-mail account,"' nor
does it read and record all e-mail messages flowing
through an ISP or "monitor web-surfing and downloading
habits of all... ISP[] customers."20 5
Of the RIPA benefits that can be applied to Carni-
vore and some of the issues raised by IITRI, the most ba-
sic is its update and harmonization of surveillance and
court order requirements for electronic surveillance. In
1986, when the ECPA was enacted, the Internet and its
communication capabilities could not have been under-
stood to evolve into what we are now facing. After all, the
boom occurred only within the last eight to nine years.
Under the ECPA, "electronic communications" have
changed drasticallyr since 1986. 206 Section 3121 trap and
trace court orders 0 are even arguably outdated for the
Web, as instead of running through a dedicated circuit for
an entire telephone conversation, information sent across
the Net via packet switching technology breaks the
transmission down into data packets and sends them
CARNIVORE SYSTEM: FINAL REPORT (2000), available at
http'//www.cdt.org/security/carnivore/O01214carniv.final.pdf (last visited Oct.
1, 2001) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. For an in-depth review of the compo-
nents and abilities of Carnivore, see id. at 3-1-28.
202. Id. at xii.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at xiii.
206. ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (1994).
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through multiple networks to their destination."°8 Further,
a pen-trap device used in these court orders, by definition,
is attached to a telephone line and records only numbers
dialed from or into that telephone line.2 9 Carnivore, on
the other hand, has the capability of intercepting the con-
tents of communications, not phone numbers.2 0 This tech-
nology is quite different from the standard telephone
capabilities of 1986. When FISA was enacted in 1978 to
allow surveillance of terrorist organizations, wire tele-
phones were the primary source of communication put
under surveillance. The Internet at that time was still a
device for scientists.2 1' An update now would allow for leg-
islation to be written in modern Web terms, specifically
contrasting traditional telephone numbers with more re-
vealing addressing information of e-mails.
New legislation would also merge existing statutes
into one section. Under the current mix, Carnivore sur-
veillance orders can be issued through three different
means - the ECPA (Title III), FISA and Section 3121.
With a new law compiling them, one act can be divided
between Carnivore interception of e-mail content as in
RIPA Chapter I; interception of a communication's trans-
actional addressing information as in Chapter II; and offi-
cial oversight as in Part IV.
It is Part IV of RIPA, high-level oversight, which is
also an imperative of any new U.S. legislation. Recent re-
actions to Carnivore have voiced a concern that under the
current system written in terms of telephone surveillance,
a diagnostic tool with the possible capabilities of scanning
all Internet network traffic demands greater oversight.
21
As RIPA creates the new positions of Interception of
Communications Commissioner and Chief Surveillance
Commissioner,213 so too must Congress appoint officials,
even within the DOJ, whose specific role is to oversee the
legal use of Carnivore and ensure privacy is protected.
208. See Wiseman, supra note 27.
209. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4) (1994).
210. See PRIVACY FOUND., LEGAL AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF
CARNIVORE CRITIQUE 1-2 (2000), available at http://www.privacyfoundation
.org/pdf/CarnivLT.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
211. See Wiseman, supra note 27.
212. See Davidson, supra note 197.
213. RIPA, 2000, c. 29, §65 (Eng.).
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Monthly reports should be required, outlining the current
state of the device and how often it is being employed.
With a tool as radical and advanced as Carnivore, DOJ
openness concerning its use will do mucl in calming fears
of the device's capabilities.
RIPA also creates another balance between privacy
and countering terrorism that may work well in the U.S.
Within Part I, ISPs are directed to provide a "reasonable
interception capability" in their networks. " If law en-
forcement is unable to make a communication intercep-
tion, the ISP will be instructed to do so. This occurs be-
cause British law enforcement lacks the capabilities of
affecting a seizure itself. The ISPs, using commercial di-
agnostic tools, will be primarily relied upon. Carnivore, on
the other hand, is employed in exactly the opposite fash-
ion - if an ISP cannot conduct the discriminatory surveil-
lance, only then will the FBI bring in its device.215
What if, however, the role was reversed, as in the
case of RIPA, and the FBI turned over Carnivore PCs to
ISPs so they could conduct the ordered surveillance them-
selves. This would further aleviate fears as it would no
longer be the government possessing the ultimate power
to survey our network connections but the ISPs them-
selves, who have far less incentive to act the "Big Brother"
role than the government. Currently, an ISP is capable of
viewing its network traffic anyway, and does so in time of
repair work. With proper constraints and duties placed on
ISPs in a new bill, Congress could enact strict guidelines
and liability, forcing ISPs to conduct the surveillance
within the constraints of the court order. Further, disclo-
sure of information should be barred to anyone other than
the FBI who has requested it. This type of "anti-tipping"
statute is already a part of RIPA."6
These changes, taken together in a new U.S. Inter-
net surveillance and privacy bill will allow for the safe use
of Carnivore while satisfying the concern of both civil lib-
ertarians and members of Congress, such as Rep. Bob
Barr (R-Ga.), who, in the past has called for the tool to be
214. Id. § 11.
215. See Kerr-Senate, supra note 40:
216. See RIPA § 54.
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reined in, with more constraints then currently exist.2 7 As
more and more personal information is being moved onto
network based files, a law following the current trend of
RIPA, based on decades if not centuries of European pri-
vacy ideals has the best chance of finding a middle ground
in satisfying both our national security concerns in light
of new international terrorism, and our desire for privacy
in this new form of 21st century communication that is
unfortunately employed by both good and bad alike.
VII. CONCLUSION
Privacy is a fundamental human right, but so is se-
curity. In the new century, the capabilities of those who
wish to bring harm to the United States will increase
drastically through use of the Internet. Combined with
realities that in the near future, nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons will be used within these borders, this
threat must be countered immediately and as effectively
as possible. Through the employment of the Carnivore
Diagnostic Tool, the FBI will have the capability to track
terrorist communications as they enter the U.S. from
around the globe. This device must, however, be deployed
in conjunction with a new, comprehensive communication
surveillance law that balances new threats with privacy
concerns as well as the full capabilities of the Net. In its
creation, the United Kingdom's RIPA must be followed as
a model for Internet privacy in the 21st digital century.
VIII. POSTSCRIPT
Regardless of the outcome in Afghanistan in the
coming months, the threat of international terrorism will
not be quashed any time soon. While Osama bin Laden
may eventually be killed or brought to trial in the U.S.,
his terror network and others just like it still span the
globe."' Others will be willing to take his place. The goal
217. Timetable Set for 'Carnivore' Disclosures, USA TODAY (Aug. 3,
2000), at http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cti333.htm.
218. See Patrick E. Tyler, British Detail bin Laden's Link to U.S. At-
tacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at Al
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of wiping out terrorism is one that will take many years
and an international undertaking the likes we have never
seen.
In the aftermath of September 11th, Congress has
rushed new legislation to the floor in an attempt to pre-
vent further attacks. One specific bill directly addressing
electronic communication surveillance is the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001.219 Of its proposed amend-
ments, Section 203(b) would empower local and federal
authorities to share knowledge of the contents of any
wire, oral or electronic communication in order to prevent
an attack on the U.S. by a foreign power or international
terrorist group.22 FISA surveillance orders targeting for-
221
eign powers would also now be extended to one year.
Further pertinent would be an amendment to the ECPA
allowing ISPs to disclose the contents of a subscriber's
electronic communication to any government authority, if
the ISP reasonably believes an emergency involving dan-
.. . . . . . 222
ger of death or serious physical injury is imminent. By
this, ISPs would now be encouraged to screen e-mails sent
through their system, looking for suspicious communica-
tions in the name of home defense.
The possibility of FBI abuse of Carnivore looms
larger than ever before, now that we have entered the re-
actionary faze in our response to the attacks. While the
system is invaluable in tracking the communications of
terrorist cells around the world, a protection of privacy
must still remain a factor in this new era. These are the
times that fundamental rights must be upheld, despite
the tendencies to take drastic measures. In expanding
surveillance orders and encouraging an overall sense of
ISP vigilance, definitive standards for Carnivore's full
implementation, taking the unique nature of an e-mail's
transmission information and content into account, are
still lacking. Clear oversight should be implemented.
Carnivore is clearly a necessary step in the new war on
terrorism, now that al Queda's capabilities have been
219. H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001).
220. Id. § 203(b).
221. Id. § 207(b).
222. Id. § 212.
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seen on U.S. soil, and fears of future attacks and Anthrax
are on the minds of many Americans. Yet Congress must
still take heed to adopt uniform safeguards and greater
oversight in the 21st century's new war on terrorism.
Seth R. Merl*
* To all those who lost their lives on the morning of September
11th, be it at work or in the line of duty at the World Trade Center, the Pen-
tagon and in a Pennsylvania corn field. We have all been filled with sorrow
and a sense of helplessness, and like all New Yorkers, I have wanted to do
something to help rebuild my city. The dedication of this Note is but a small
token.
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